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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2-2(3)0) (1953), as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Defendants' 
awareness of the TKI acquisition and of Plaintiff s reliance upon Defendants' audit prior 
to the completion of the audit, where: 
a. Plaintiff offered evidence that a TKI director sought advice from 
Defendants on March 31, 1993, regarding the effects of the 
contemplated acquisition; 
b. Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants' 
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audit was not completed until June 30, 1993; and 
c. Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants 
knew that Plaintiff and its stockholders would be relying upon 
Defendants' audit. 
Standard of review: On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this 
Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no 
deference. Workman v. Brighton Properties. Inc.. 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 1999). 
2. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs 
damages where: 
a. Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants did 
not conduct the TKI audit in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting procedures and standards; and 
b. Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that the Defendants' 
failure to do so caused Plaintiff to realize approximately two-
hundred fifty-thousand ($250,000.00) dollars less than was 
represented by Defendants. 
Standard of review: On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this 
Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no 
deference. Workman v. Brighton Properties. Inc.. 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 1999). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
1. A.I.C.P.A. Professional Standards AU §560.10. There is a period after the 
balance-sheet date with which the auditor must be concerned in completing 
various phases of his audit. This period is known as the "subsequent 
period" and is considered to extend to the date of the auditor's report. Its 
duration will depend upon the practical requirements of each audit and may 
vary from a relatively short period to one of several months. Also, all 
auditing procedures are not carried out a t the same time and some phases of 
an audit will be performed during the subsequent period, whereas other 
phases will be substantially completed on or before the balance-sheet date. 
As an audit approaches completion, the auditor will be concentrating on the 
unresolved auditing and reporting matters and he is not expected to be 
conducting a continuing review of those matters to which he has previously 
applied auditing procedures and reached satisfaction. 
2. Generally Accepted Accounting Standards §B05.105, B05.107. 
a. B05.105. For accounting purposes, the term "current assets" is used 
to designate cash and other assets or resources commonly identified 
as those that are reasonably expected to be realized in cash or sold or 
consumed during the normal operating cycle of the business. Thus, 
the term comprehends in general such resources as (a) cash available 
for current operations and items that are the equivalent of cash; (b) 
inventories of merchandise, raw materials, goods in process, finished 
goods, operating supplies, and ordinary maintenance material and 
parts; (c) trade accounts, notes, and acceptances receivable; (d) 
receivables from officers, employees, affiliates, and others, if 
collectible in the ordinary course of business within a year; (e) 
installment or deferred accounts and notes receivable if they conform 
generally to normal trade practices and terms within the business; (f) 
marketable securities representing the investment of cash available 
for current operations, including investments in debt and equity 
securities classified as trading securities under Section 180, 
"Investments: Debt and Equity Securities"; and (g) prepaid expenses 
such as insurance, interest, rents, taxes, unused royalties, current paid 
advertising service not yet received, and operating supplies. Prepaid 
expenses are current assets not in the sense that they will be 
converted into cash, but in the sense that, if not paid in advance, they 
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would require the use of current assets during the operating cycle. 
b. B05.107. This concept of the nature or current assets contemplates 
the exclusion from that classification of such resources as: (a) cash 
and claims to cash that are restricted as to withdrawal or use for 
other than current operations, are designated for expenditure in the 
acquisition or construction of noncurrent assets, or are segregated for 
the liquidation of long-term debts; (b) investments in securities 
(whether marketable or not) or advances that have been made for the 
purposes of control, affiliation, or other continuing business 
advantage; (c) receivables arising from unusual transactions (such as 
the sale of capital assets, or loans or advances to affiliates, officers, 
or employees) that are not expected to be collected within 12 
months; (d) cash surrender value of life insurance policies; (e) land 
and other natural resources; (f) depreciable assets; and (g) long-term 
prepayments that are fairly chargeable to the operations of several 
years, or deferred charges such as bonus payments under a long-term 
lease, costs of rearrangement of factory layout, or removal to a new 
location. 
3. Utah Code Annotated 58-26-12. No person licensed or authorized to 
practice under this chapter or any of his employees, partners, members, 
officers, or shareholders are liable to persons with whom they are not in 
privity of contract for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, 
decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services 
performed by him, except for: 
(1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or 
intentional misrepresentations; or 
(2) other acts omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person knew that a 
primary intent of the client was for the professional services to 
benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action; except, 
however, for the purposes of this subsection, if the person: 
(a) identified in writing to the client those persons who are 
intended to rely on the services; and 
(b) sent a copy of the writing or similar statement to the persons 
identified in the writing or statement, then he or any of his 
employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may 
be liable only to the persons intended to rely, in addition to 
those persons in privity of contract with him. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from the damages inflicted upon a corporation by an accounting 
firm's negligence. The Plaintiff-corporation, having an interest in acquiring the assets of 
a third-party company, began an investigation of the company's finances. During the 
investigation, the Plaintiff-corporation relied heavily upon an audit of the company's 
finances provided by Defendant-accountants. The Defendant-accountants, however, were 
negligent in their preparation of the audit, which negligence caused the assets of the 
company to appear significantly greater than they really were. The Plaintiff-corporation 
proceeded with the acquisition based primarily upon the inflated figures in the audit. 
Upon acquiring the assets, however, the Plaintiff-corporation quickly realized that the 
assets were much less than anticipated and brought suit against Defendant-accountants for 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on 
two grounds. First, the trial court found that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that 
Defendants' actions had caused any damage to Plaintiff. The significance of this finding 
flows from the fact that damages are an essential element of standing as well as 
negligence, without which the case could not go forward. Second, the trial court found 
that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s reliance on 
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the audit. The significance of this finding flows from the fact that, under the statutory 
privity defense, accountants cannot be held liable for damages caused to a third party by 
the type of negligence alleged unless they were aware that the third party would be 
relying on the audit. Thus, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to 
two elements essential to Plaintiffs claim, and that Defendants were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law as to those elements, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff 
appeals the grant of summary judgment to Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Citing to Record Index ("R ") 
The parties to the case 
1. Plaintiff, PAPERWISE, fka TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, INC. 
("TKA"), is a Texas corporation with its registered office in Dallas County, Texas, and its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs Complaint §1, Rl; 
Defendants' Answer §1, R17. 
2. Defendant, JONES JENSEN ORTON & COMPANY ("JJOC"), is an 
organization of certified public accountants that forms a Utah general partnership, has at 
least one general partner who is a Utah resident, and has its principal place of business at 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City. Plaintiffs Complaint §2, R2; Defendants' 
Answer §2, 7,R17-18. 
3. On information and belief, Defendant ROBERT GORDON JONES 
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("Jones") was the JJOC partner who signed the balance sheets, financial statements, and 
the Auditor's Report, having participated in the drafting, editing, and reviewing of the 
audit documents relevant to this lawsuit. Jones 1994 Depo., p24, 26-30, 33-36, 41-42. 
4. In any event, Jones has admitted in deposition testimony that he was the 
JJOC partner in charge of the relevant audit. Jones 1994 depo., R964. 
Techknowlogy, Inc. ("TKI") hires Defendants 
5. Beginning in 1989, Defendants were hired by Techknowlogy, Inc. ("TKI"), 
a Utah company engaged in the production and marketing of specialized software 
products, to audit TKI's financial records on an annual basis. Defendants' Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §1, R860; Jones 1994 depo, R955; 
Plaintiffs Complaint §6-7, R2; Defendants' Answer §6-7, R17-18. 
The TAP account receivable is created 
6. At some point during the 1993 fiscal year, TKI loaned approximately 
$250,000 to a company known as Techknowlogy Asian Pacific ("TAP"). Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R94, 860. 
7. There is no evidence in either JJOC's working papers or the Master 
Distributor's Agreement to suggest that an actual promissory note or other binding 
document ever existed to evidence and enforce TAP's repayment obligation. Bramble 
Second Affidavit §12, R239. 
8. The nature of the transaction gives rise to several limitations on TAP's 
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repayment obligation that distinguishes it from a legally enforceable debt: (1) the 
obligation imposed no personal liability on the obligor, (2) the obligation did not bear 
interest, (3) the obligation could be canceled at any time if the Master Distribution 
Agreement was terminated, and (4) the obligation was contingent upon and would only be 
paid out of a five-percent royalty on future sales. Bramble Second Affidavit §9, R238-
239; Master Distributor Agreement §31, R257-258. 
Plaintiff TKA is incorporated and organized in May 1993 
9. In May 1993, TKA was incorporated and organized for the purpose of 
acquiring the assets of TKI as well as succeeding to its business. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §12, R862, Plaintiffs 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment §1, R1022. 
Defendants begin to issue the TKI audit materials on May 17,1993 
10. Defendants first issued TKI audit materials on May 17,1993. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §4, R860. 
11. Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that the May 17 audit 
materials, which included TKFs balance sheets but no financial documents or auditor's 
report, were neither complete nor final. Bramble First Affidavit §3-13, R984-988. 
12. Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that AICPA 
Professional Standards require a "subsequent period" following the issuing of balance 
sheets to allow the accountants to "perform certain audit procedures for transactions or 
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events occurring after the balance-sheet date." Bramble First Affidavit §8, R985, quoting 
AICPA Professional Standards AU §560.10, R315. 
13. Defendants subsequently made various additions and alterations to the audit 
on numerous occasions for the purpose of updating the audit in conformity with AICPA 
Professional Standards. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 10, 12-13, R984-988. 
Defendants learn of the proposed acquisition during the "subsequent period" 
14. Plaintiff entered evidence that Defendants were already aware of the 
proposed merger at the time the first audit materials were issued on May 17, 1993. 
Plaintiffs Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R959. 
15. Defendants entered evidence that they did not learn of the proposed 
acquisition until after May 17, 1993. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment §7, 
R861. 
16. Plaintiff entered evidence that, in any event, Defendants learned of the 
proposed acquisition no later than May 28, 1993. Plaintiffs Response to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R958. 
17. Defendants' knowledge and awareness of the proposed acquisition is 
reflected in footnote 11 in the audit report, which was entered into the report on June 30, 
1993, under the signature of Defendant JONES. Auditor's Report, footnote 11, R316-
317. 
18. The substance of footnote 11 also evidences that Defendants knew that TKI 
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intended to benefit Plaintiff by having Defendants perform the audit. Bramble Third 
Affidavit §4, 7, Rl066-1067. 
Defendants complete the TKI audit on June 30,1993 
19. Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that the audit could 
not have been completed earlier than June 30, 1993, the date the Auditor's Report was 
issued in complete form. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 6, R984-985. 
All versions of the TKI audit contained the same misclassification of the TAP 
account receivable 
20. In all versions of the TKI audit, Defendants listed the TAP obligation as an 
account receivable in the category of "current assets" in the amount of $251,509.00. TKI 
Balance Sheets, R102; Bramble Second Affidavit §4, R237. 
21. Generally Accepted Accounting Standards ("GAAS") define "current 
assets" as cash and other assets or resources that are reasonably expected to be realized in 
cash or sold or consumed during the "normal operating cycle of business." Bramble 
Second Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS B05.105, R263-264. 
22. An "operating cycle", which is defined as the average time intervening 
between the acquisition of materials or services and the final cash realization from the 
sale of products or services, is generally presumed to be 12 months. Bramble Second 
Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS B05.107, R264-265. 
23. An account receivable may not be listed as a "current asset" if collection is 
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not expected within twelve months. Bramble Second Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS, 
B05.107,R264-265. 
24. The repayment schedule for the TAP obligation, which extended over the 
ten-year period from 1993 to 2003, provided that only $3,750.00 of the total obligation 
would be paid back in the first twelve months. Bramble Second Affidavit § 13, R239-240; 
Master Distributor Agreement §31.3, R258. 
25. The remaining $246,250.00 balance could not properly be classified as a 
"current asset" because collection was not expected within the first twelve-month period. 
Bramble Second Affidavit §13, R988; GAAS, B05.107, R264-265. 
26. Thus, Defendants' classification of the TAP obligation as a "current asset" 
was not in conformity with either Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures ("GAAP") 
or Generally Accepted Accounting Standards ("GAAS"). Bramble Second Affidavit §6, 
12-44, R236, 239-246. 
The misclassification of the TAP obligation is significant and material 
27. This misclassification resulted in a significant overstatement of TKI's 
assets, as the TAP obligation of $251,509.00 represented a 21.2 percent increase in the 
total $1,186,943.00 current assets listed. Bramble Second Affidavit §21, R241. 
28. The TAP obligation also represented 27.6 percent of the total $910,450.00 
accounts receivable listed, and 18.6 percent of the $1,351,736.00 total assets listed. 
Bramble Second Affidavit §21, R241. 
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Relying upon the erroneous information, Plaintiff proceeds with the acquisition of 
TKTs assets 
29. Plaintiffs acquisition of TKTs assets was executed in accordance with the 
Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23, 1993, and the Asset 
Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 1993, and the General Conveyance executed in 
connection with the Asset Acquisition Agreement. Defendants' Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment §13, R862; Plaintiffs Response to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R1029. 
30. Under the agreements, Plaintiff agreed to issue additional shares of its stock 
to the officers and shareholders of TKI in exchange for TKTs assets. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §14, R862-863. 
31. Under the agreements, TKI was obligated to transfer "all accounts 
receivable of TKI and all other rights of TKI to Payment for goods sold or leased or for 
services rendered, including without limitation those which are not evidenced by 
instruments or chattel paper, whether or not they have been earned by performance or 
have been written off or reserved against as a bad debt or doubtful account in any 
Financial Statements" in return for the stock. General Conveyance §1(8), R502. 
Plaintiff was damaged by the misclassiflcation 
32. As a result of Defendants' failure to adhere to GAAP and GAAS, Plaintiffs 
acquired assets from TKI that were $251,509.00 less than reasonably expected. Bramble 
16 
Second Affidavit §43-44, R246; Bramble Third Affidavit §8-9, R1068-1069. 
Plaintiff files suit against Defendants 
33. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants for negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation. Plaintiffs Complaint, Rl. 
34. Defendants entered a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff 
could not adequately demonstrate either that it had been damaged or that Defendants were 
aware that Plaintiff would be relying upon the TKI audit in contemplation of the 
acquisition. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, R81, 854. 
35. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion on both grounds. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rl 100; Order of Summary Judgment, Rl 108. 
3 6. Plaintiff now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where all of the pleadings, evidence, 
admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, show that: (1) no genuine issues of material fact exist, and (2) the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980 (Utah 1972). 
Plaintiffs appeal is based in its belief that the trial court erred in concluding that no 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to either Defendants' awareness of Plaintiff s 
reliance or to Plaintiffs damages. 
There is no question that Plaintiff properly submitted evidence, including expert 
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opinion, that Defendants knew that Plaintiff would be relying on the TKI audit in 
contemplation of acquiring TKI's assets. This is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Well-settled summary judgment principles establish that Plaintiff does not 
have to do anything more to meet its burden. In order for the non-moving party to 
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it 
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-
moving party to show facts controverting the facts stated in the moving party's affidavit. 
Similarly, there is no question that Plaintiff properly submitted evidence, including 
expert opinion, that Defendants' negligence caused Plaintiff to suffer damages. This is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Well-settled summary judgment 
principles establish that Plaintiff does not have to do anything more to meet its burden. In 
order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment 
and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal 
theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts controverting the facts 
stated in the moving party's affidavit. 
All the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that genuine issues of material fact do exist. The 
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant should therefore 
be reversed. 
18 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants because genuine 
issues of material fact exist with respect to both Plaintiffs damages and Defendant's 
awareness of the subject acquisition. 
Point I: Summary judgment is inappropriate because Plaintiff has submitted 
evidence, including expert opinion, that the Defendant did not complete 
the audit until June 30,1993, giving rise to a genuine dispute over 
whether Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s reliance prior to 
completion of the audit that must be resolved as a question of fact. 
The requirements of the summary judgment procedure, set forth in Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are well settled. "To sustain a summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the 
[non-moving] party, must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the 
[moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 
980 (Utah 1972). "Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, that the [non-
moving] party could win if given a trial." Id. A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the 
basis of the facts in the record in a case such as this, reasonable minds could differ on 
whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard. Jackson v. Dabnev, 
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). "If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the 
motion should be denied." Ruffmengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). "Even if 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings and other documents demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). "In 
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order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment 
and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal 
theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts controverting the facts 
stated in the moving party's affidavit." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 
761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Even "where the parties were not in complete conflict 
as to certain facts, but the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were 
vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only be 
resolved by a trial." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). "Negligence cases 
often require the drawing of inferences from facts, which is properly done by juries rather 
than judges." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 191 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). "Summary judgment 
is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't 
ofTransp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, "trial courts must avoid 
weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on summary judgment." Id. 
As applied to the instant case, the above body of law provides support for 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants only if the pleadings, evidence, admissions, 
and inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The issue of Defendants' awareness is material to Plaintiffs claim because, as per 
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the statutory privity defense, an accountant cannot be held liable to a third party for the 
type of negligence alleged unless the accountant knew that his client intended the 
accountant's services to benefit the third party. U.C.A. 58-26-12. In other words, the 
statutory privity defense protects Defendants from Plaintiffs claim if it is demonstrated 
that Defendants were unaware that Plaintiff would be relying on the subject audit in its 
dealings with TKI. Inversely, Defendants would be unable to raise the defense if it was 
demonstrated that they were aware that Plaintiff was intended to rely on the audit in 
contemplation of the acquisition. Thus, as resolution of this issue determines whether 
Plaintiffs claim may go forward, evidence relating to whether and when Defendants 
became aware of Plaintiff s reliance is clearly material. 
Plaintiff, in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, properly 
submitted evidence that included expert opinion in support of its argument that 
Defendants were aware that Plaintiff would be relying on the TKI audit in contemplation 
of acquiring TKI's assets prior to completion of the audit. Specifically, Plaintiff 
submitted evidence that a TKI director sought advice from Defendants JJOC on March 
31, 1993, as to the effects of the contemplated transaction. Plaintiffs Response to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R959. More importantly, 
Plaintiff submitted expert testimony that the audit itself, particularly footnote 11, 
evidences that Defendants knew that TKI intended to benefit Plaintiff by having 
Defendants perform the audit. Bramble Third Affidavit §4, 7, R1066-1067. This 
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evidence and testimony directly contradicts Defendants' assertions that they knew 
nothing of the proposed acquisition prior to May 17, 1993. The fact that both parties have 
entered contradictory evidence relating to a relevant issue gives rise to a genuine issue of 
material fact that precludes summary judgment. The well-settled summary judgment 
principles discussed in Part I establish that Plaintiff does not have to do anything more to 
meet its burden. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) "In order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for 
summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to 
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts 
controverting the facts stated in the moving party's affidavit." Id. The presence of such a 
factual dispute precludes entry of summary judgment. Id. 
In addition to record evidence, Plaintiff has also submitted the expert testimony of 
Curtis Bramble, a certified public accountant for over fifteen years and a member of an 
accountant review board that assists the Department of Professional Licensing, for the 
purpose of establishing that Defendants could not have completed the TKI audit earlier 
than June 30, 1993. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 6, R984-985. This testimony directly 
contradicts Defendants' assertions that they completed the audit on May 17, 1993. This 
testimony is also buttressed by the undisputed fact that Defendants did, indeed, continue 
to make alterations and revisions to the audit documents after May 17 all the way through 
June 30, 1993. Well-settled summary judgment principles establish that it is improper for 
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a court to weigh evidence and assess credibility, as the trial court has apparently done 
here. Truiillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "Trial courts 
must avoid weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on summary 
judgment." Id. Thus, Bramble's testimony may not simply be disregarded; the court 
must accord consideration to his testimony at least equal to that extended to Defendants' 
evidence. 
Thus, Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of factual disputes relating to 
whether Defendant was aware, prior to completion of the TKI audit, that Plaintiff would 
subsequently be relying upon the audit in contemplation of acquiring TKI's assets. One 
dispute is over the exact date Defendants became aware of the contemplated acquisition. 
The other dispute is over the exact date the audit was completed. As these are clearly 
questions of fact that are most properly resolved by a fact-finder, the summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants must be reversed. 
Point II: Summary judgment in inappropriate because Plaintiff has submitted 
evidence, including expert opinion, that it was damaged by the 
negligent misclassification of the TAP account, giving rise to a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was damaged. 
The issue of Plaintiff s damages is material in terms of both standing and prima 
facie negligence. Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 3 P.3d 722 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000) (to have standing sufficient to seek damages, a plaintiff "must be able to show that 
he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury"); J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 
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115 (Utah 1992) ("a negligence claim requires a showing of the suffering of damages by 
the plaintiff). Thus, as resolution of this issue determines whether Plaintiffs claim may 
go forward, evidence relating to whether Plaintiff suffered damage as a result of 
Defendants' acts is clearly material. 
Plaintiff, in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, properly 
submitted evidence that included expert opinion in support of its argument that Plaintiff 
suffered damages as a result of Defendants' acts. Specifically, Plaintiff entered affidavits 
by Curtis Bramble stating, in essence, that "Defendants [falsely] declared more receivable 
or net income be classifying expenses as a receivable rather than an expense." Bramble 
Third Affidavit §8-9, R1068-1069. This caused Plaintiff to suffer "damages relative to 
misrepresentation of assets via the TAP account receivable." Bramble Third Affidavit 
§8-9, Rl068-1069. Put simply, Defendants' negligent misstatement deceived Plaintiff 
into purchasing something worth a quarter of a million dollars less than represented. 
There can be no question that this caused Plaintiff to suffer damages. Damages exist 
where one has deprived another of the use and control of the other's own assets. 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Common sense yields a similar 
result; even one unschooled in the law must know that he cannot lie about the value of his 
wares and go unpunished if he is caught. Indeed, the well-established crime of false 
advertising is perfectly analogous to the instant situation. Furthermore, Defendants' 
negligence severely prejudiced Plaintiffs good faith attempt to succeed to TKI's business 
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by leaving Plaintiff with approximately $250,000 less than planned. Considering the 
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is simply unreasonable to 
argue that Plaintiff has not done enough to send the issue of damages to a fact-finder to 
decide. 
Defendants make additional points in their effort to demonstrate that their 
negligence did not harm Plaintiff. One point is that Plaintiff could not have been 
damaged because the TAP account receivable was never actually transferred to Plaintiff. 
This argument is nonsensical and ultimately irrelevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff 
suffered damages. Assuming for a moment that the TAP account receivable was never 
transferred to Plaintiff, it would have remained in the control of TKI. This is, in fact, 
precisely what Defendants allege actually occurred; Defendants allege that it was held 
back for the purpose of covering certain expenses and liabilities incurred by TKI. Such 
an occurrence would be no less harmful to Plaintiff than if the Plaintiff had actually 
received the TAP obligation masquerading as an asset. The bottom line is that Plaintiff 
did not receive the $251,509.00 asset it reasonably expected to receive based on 
Defendants' audit. Plaintiffs expectation that it would receive the TAP account 
receivable was certainly reasonable considering that language of the General 
Conveyance, which provided that Plaintiff would receive: 
all accounts receivable of TKI and all other rights of TKI to Payment for goods 
sold or leased or for services rendered, including without limitation those which 
are not evidenced by instruments or chattel paper, whether or not they have been 
earned by performance or have been written off or reserved against as a bad debt 
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or doubtful account in any Financial Statements. 
General Conveyance §1(8), R502 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff had a right to all 
account receivables listed in Defendants' balance sheets, including the TAP account 
receivable. Regardless of whether Plaintiff did not receive it because TKI held it back or 
because it was not what the audit purported it to be, the end result would be the same: 
Plaintiff did not receive the $251,509.00 asset it reasonably and rightfully expected to 
receive. Plaintiff further supported this proposition with expert testimony. Bramble 
Third Affidavit §8-9, R106801069. Thus, the issue of whether the TAP account 
receivable was actually transferred to Plaintiff has no bearing on the question of damages 
and is immaterial. 
Another point Defendants try to make is that Plaintiff suffered no losses because 
the only consideration ever paid for the acquired assets was stock in TKA. This is an 
enigmatic statement to say the least, because there is no question that corporate stock, 
which the officers and shareholders of TKI received via the acquisition, clearly has 
economic value. Defendants seemingly would take the position that TKI was amenable 
to simply giving away its assets while knowing that it would receive nothing in return. 
This is hardly realistic. Defendant cannot reasonably make the argument that a situation 
where two parties exchange assets for stock is identical to a situation where one party 
gives all of its assets to the other without any compensation. The facts are clear: Plaintiff 
gave the officers and shareholders of TKI stock in TKA in consideration for the TKI 
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assets it acquired, and the TKI officers and shareholders saw the stock as valuable 
consideration commensurate with the assets it transferred. Indeed, these facts suggest that 
the Defendants' proposition is unlikely. It must also be noted that Defendants fail to cite 
to a single on-point example in support of this proposition. As Plaintiff has met 
Defendants' questionable damages claim with expert testimony that Plaintiff did, indeed, 
suffer damages, it must be found that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude 
summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment to Defendants must be reversed. 
Point III: Summary judgment is inappropriate because Defendants have failed to 
meet the standard of showing a "clear instance" of appropriateness. 
Finally, Utah courts generally recognize that "negligence cases often require the 
drawing of inferences from facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges." 
Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App. 277 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The rule that 
flows from this analysis is that "summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases 
only in the clearest instances." Id. It cannot realistically be argued that summary 
judgment is clearly appropriate in the instant case. Plaintiff has not simply rested on its 
allegations, but instead has properly entered substantial evidence and expert testimony 
that contradicts the facts asserted by the moving party. As the non-moving party is 
entitled to the most favorable light, it must be found that Plaintiff has demonstrated the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. 
27 
CONCLUSION 
Because genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is inappropriate 
and must not be granted to Defendants. 
In sum, the trial court erred in holding that no genuine issues of material fact exist 
with respect to Defendants' awareness of the acquisition and Plaintiffs reliance, and to 
Plaintiffs damages. Viewing all pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that genuine issues of material 
fact exist with respect to Defendants' awareness of Plaintiff s reliance and to Plaintiffs 
damages. Moreover, there is a general tendency to avoid summary judgment in 
negligence cases like the instant case. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Defendants should therefore be reversed. 
DATED this < J day of May, 2002. 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Young, Kester & Petro 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
L^ 
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801)531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAPERWISE, INC., fka : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, 
INC., : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, a Utah partnership, : 
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an 
individual, : Civil No. 960905873-CV 
Defendants. : Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY, : 
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
v. 
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH 
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC., : 
a corporation, and its successors in 
interest, STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and 
WINSTON LEE, individuals, 
Third Party Defendants. 
Based upon the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered concurrently herewith, 
and good cause appearing, now therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants Jones, 
Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment be and the 
same is hereby granted and the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
No attorneys' fees are awarded and costs in the amount of $ is hereby awarded 
to Defendants JJOC as against Plaintiff Paperwise. 
JJOC's Third Party Complaint is hereby voluntarily withdrawn and dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, each party to bear its own attorneys fees, court 
costs and expenses. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehnng 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Michael J. Petro 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Michael L. Deamer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-> N. Hoole 
s for Third Party Defendants 5cqmid/569 
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801)531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAPERWISE, INC.,fka 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, a Utah partnership, 
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an 
individual, Civil No. 960905873-CV 
Defendants. 
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY, 
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH 
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC., 
a corporation, and its successors in 
interest. STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and 
WINSTON LEE, individuals, 
Third Partv Defendants. 
The motion of Defendants Jones, Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones, 
(hereinafter "JJOC") for summary judgment came on for hearing before the above-entitled court, 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, August 27, 2001, 
at the courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah with Michael J. Petro, Esq. appearing on behalf of 
Plaintiff, Michael L. Deamer, Esq. appearing on behalf of JJOC and Gregory N. Hoole appearing 
on behalf of Third Party Defendants and the court having reviewed the memorandums of law, and 
affidavits and having heai'd argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises now 
enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Techknowlogy, Inc. (herein "TKI") retained JJOC to perform its routine annual 
year-end audit for the period ending March 31, 1993. No other entity hired JJOC to perform said 
audit nor did any entity at any time pay for the audit services performed. 
2. TKI did not hire JJOC to perform an audit in connection with a proposed Asset 
Acquisition Agreement with Plaintiff or with any entity known as Newco, Charles Pace or any 
other entity or individual from Texas. 
3. Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence or proof of any kind that JJOC or 
any of its officers, agents or employees had any knowledge of a proposed sale of TKI's assets to 
Plaintiff prior to the completion of their audit field work on May 3, 1993 and the issuance of their 
written audit report on May 17, 1993. 
4. In fact, there was substantial testimony that there was no deal in Texas at the time 
JJOCs audit report was issued and that TKI was in the process of raising money. Larry Edwards, 
i 
the president of TKI testified that he did not even tell JJOC they would be using their March 31, 
1993 audit report in a proposed Private Placement Memorandum of Plaintiffs'. 
5. The disputed portion of JJOC's audit report centers on an account receivable from 
a subsidiary company known as Techknowlogy Asia Pacific ("TAP") to which entity TKI lent 
some $250,000.00 for the payment of rent, utilities and the purchase of office furnishings. 
During the course of the audit, JJOC sent a positive written confirmation to TAP and received a 
signed contract from TAP memorializing the obligation of TAP to reimburse TKI for $250,000.00 
and additionally verified the existence of cancelled checks totaling at least $250,000.00 evidencing 
actual payments by TKI. 
6. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the TAP account receivable was transferred 
to Plaintiff as part of the Asset Acquisition Agreement and in fact, Steve Christensen, vice-
president and director of TKI would testified that the TAP account receivable was not transferred 
to Plaintiff. 
7. JJOC's audit report was issued on May 17, 1993 with a date of May 3, 1993, and 
concluded that TKI was "not a going concern" because it lost over $533,000.00 in 1991 from 
operations, $1.8 million in 1992 and $533,000.00 as of March 31, 1993. 
8. JJOC first learned of the proposed transfer of some of the assets to a group in Texas 
after the issuance of their audit report on May 17, 1993. As a result thereof, JJOC on June 30, 
1993, added a footnote 11 to the audit report, which footnote is dated June 30, 1993, disclosing 
a proposed sale of some of TKI's assets to a corporation in Texas. 
•> j 
9. Plaintiff Paperwise (formerly known as Techknowlogy Acquisition, Inc.) was a 
corporation formed in May, 1993 in Texas for the sole purpose of purchasing some (but not all) 
of the assets of TKI. Pursuant to a Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23, 
1993, Paperwise issued stock to the public for cash in July 1993. 
10. On August 16, 1993, TKI and Paperwise entered into an Asset Acquisition 
Agreement whereby Paperwise agreed to issue additional shares of its stock to the individual 
shareholders of TKI in return for a transfer of some (but not all) of the assets of TKI. 
11. Approximately $659,000.00 in accounts receivables and miscellaneous assets were 
retained by TKI to pay IRS taxes, the Kissane and Woodbridge claims and other scheduled 
liabilities. 
12. After the consummation of the Asset Acquisition Agreement between Paperwise 
and TKI on August 16, 1993, the former officers and directors of TKI became employees of 
Paperwise until they were terminated for cause variously in January of 1994 through June of 1994. 
13. When Plaintiff terminated the employment of the former TKI officers and directors 
it cancelled all of Paperwise stock issued to said individuals, in effect rescinding the Asset 
Acquisition Agreement of August 16, 1993, but did not return any of the assets of TKI to its 
former owners or to TKI. 
14. Paperwise gave no other property, monies or consideration for the assets of TKI 
other than stock in Paperwise which it subsequently cancelled and rescinded within six to nine 
months after issuance. 
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15. In September 1996, more than three years after the Asset Acquisition Agreement, 
Paperwise failed and filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Dallas, Texas. 
16. Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no proof of any other damages suffered other than 
the bankruptcy of Paperwise in 1996. 
17. Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no evidence or proof that the TAP account 
receivable was actually transferred to Paperwise as part of the asset acquisition transaction with 
TKI. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) limits the liability of persons providing accounting 
services to those with whom the accountant is in privity. Under the statute, privity may extend 
beyond the client for whom services are provided "if the person knew that a primary intent of the 
client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the 
action...". 
2. There is no competent evidence in the record or submitted by Plaintiff that JJOC 
knew of the proposed asset sale or the identity of the proposed purchaser of TKTs diSStts as of 
May 17, 1993, the date when the audit opinion was issued, hence the privity statute does not 
extend to Paperwise. 
3. Extending all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the facts and 
the record, JJOC is entitled to the privity protection of U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) as each of the 
statutory elements appear from the record to ha\ • been met. 
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4. Plaintiffs contention that JJOC knew that TKI was cash strapped and seeking to 
raise money in advance of issuing its audit report is insufficient to extend JJOC's statutory privity 
protection as such an interpretation would imperil any accountant who undertook to perform 
services for an otherwise insolvent or thinly capitalized company. This is not the intention of the 
privity statute. 
5. The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 does not broaden or extend the 
privity protection of U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) based on the interpretation of the statute regarding 
"influencing a particular person" used in U.C.A. §58-26-12(2). 
6. The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 by JJOC was reasonable under 
Professional Accounting Standards SAS (Statement of Accountant Standards) No. 1, AU §561 
regarding an accountant's duty upon discovery of a subsequent event that may materially affect 
the financial statements. 
7. There is no evidence in the record that would support a finding that Plaintiff 
suffered any damage as a result of JJOC's conduct. 
8. Paperwise effectively rescinded the Asset Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 
1993 with TKI upon cancellation of stock issued in consideration of the sale of those assets, but 
failed to return any assets to TKI or its previous shareholders. As such, Paperwise suffered no 
damages. 
9. In the absence of any damages, any causes of action alleged by Paperwise must fail. 
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10. Plaintiffs claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are denied and 
3efendant JJOC is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as against Plaintiff Paperwise on all 
Paperwise claims. 
11. Upon the grant of summary judgment in JJOC's favor as against Plaintiff 
Paperwise, JJOC may voluntarily withdraw its Third Party Complaint against Defendants Larry 
Edward and Mary Beth Edwards, Techknowlogy, Inc., Steven Christensen and Winston Lee. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Michael J. Petro 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Michael L. Deamer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants 
5cqmld/568 
7 
